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A PALATABLE OPTION FOR SUGAR-COATED PALATES:
LABELING AS THE LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM
INTERVENTION THAT AMERICAN CONSUMERS NEED
Nicholas G. Miller
Abstract
Addressing nutritional health for Americans has proven uniquely
challenging in a marketplace flooded with non-nutritious food products.
Compounding the issue, consumers consistently misjudge the contents of
these processed foods and undervalue their pernicious effect. At the same
time, consumers are wary of overly intrusive or paternalistic government
interventions, such as bans and portion limits. This Article reflects on the
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of previous attempts by the FDA to combat
public health threats. Finally, this Article proposes a path forward, with
growing political momentum, that builds on the innovative food labeling
models being tested in markets around the world.
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................428
I.

The FDA’S ORIGINAL MANDATE TO ADDRESS
FOOD SAFETY .........................................................................430
A. Historical Origins of the FDA ........................................430
B. Legislative Development of the FDA’s
Statutory Authority .........................................................431
C. Judicial Interpretation of Food Safety Laws ..................432

II.

THE FDA’S CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING THE
ISSUE OF NUTRITION ...............................................................434
A. The Nutritional Health Crisis .........................................435
1. Impact of Processed Foods......................................436
2. Overconsumption of Sugar and Associated
Health Effects ..........................................................437
B. Low Consumer Awareness—Requires a
New Education Effort .....................................................438
C. Bureaucratic Obstacles to Sweeping
Changes by the FDA.......................................................439
1. Limited by Operating Within a Fragmented
Food Regulatory System .........................................439
a. Influence of Agriculture Interests ....................441
b. Dietary Guidelines ...........................................442

 J.D. 2021, UCLA School of Law; B.S.E., Concentration in Entrepreneurship and
Innovation, 2016, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks to Professor
Michael T. Roberts, Director of the Resnick Center for Food Law and Policy at UCLA School of
Law, for invaluable assistance in developing this Article.
427

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

428

2.

3.

[Vol. 31

Political Feasibility Limits from Industry
and Consumers ........................................................442
a. Ban on Artificial Sweeteners ...........................443
b. Supplements and DSHEA Response ...............444
Limitations from Budgetary Constraints .................445

III.

FDA’S SHIFT TO LABELING AS AN INCREMENTAL
APPROACH TO IMPROVING NUTRITION ...................................446
A. FDA Has Clear Authority Over Labeling ......................446
1. Origins and Development of Food
Labeling Authority ..................................................447
2. Types of Label Requirements—Affirmative
and Permissible Claims ...........................................448
3. Labeling is the Least Paternalistic Intervention ......449
B. Label Standardization Negates Fragmentation
in the Regulatory Environment.......................................449
1. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
of 1990 and Rise of Uniform Labels .......................450
2. Expressly Preempts State Requirements .................450
C. Labeling is an Economically Efficient
Approach to Nutrition Regulation ..................................451
D. 2016 Nutrition Panel Update by FDA
Exemplifies the Incremental Approach ..........................451
1. Changes Including Added Sugar
and Daily Value .......................................................452
2. Industry Influence on the “Added
Sugar” Debate .........................................................453

IV.

THE FDA’S FUTURE IN PROMOTING NUTRITION ....................454
A. Focusing on Nutritional Nudges via
Informative Labeling ......................................................454
B. Front of Package Labeling and Visuals .........................455

CONCLUSION .........................................................................................456
APPENDIX .............................................................................................457
INTRODUCTION
How has the land of the free become the home of the overweight? An
increase in obesity is part of a larger epidemic of chronic disease
stemming from the harmful dietary patterns of Americans. These harmful
dietary patterns include a rise in the proportion of empty calories in the
form of added sugars from processed foods and sweetened beverages,
which leave little room in the diet for nutritious foods.
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This Article explores how the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)—the executive agency charged with insuring food safety—can
respond to the nutrition crisis with an incremental approach that relies on
labeling. Part I will describe the origins of the FDA and the traditional
limitations on its power as contextual background to a discussion of the
FDA’s authority to regulate relative to the checks of the legislative and
judicial branches.1
Part II explains how the FDA’s original goal of protecting against
contamination and unsanitary food preparation has evolved into
responding to the health risks imposed by non-nutritious foods.2 The
modern nutrition crisis is analyzed, along with the related issues of
consumer awareness and the bounds of rational decision-making by
consumers. Furthermore, the FDA’s ability to respond to nutritional
issues is examined, insofar as the FDA is hampered by its position in a
fragmented regulatory system where overlapping agencies, such as the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), hold the reins. The
FDA is also limited by political forces, such as lobbying by industries
that do not want to be restricted (as illustrated by two examples of failed
regulatory efforts by the FDA), and by practical budgetary restraints.
Part III examines the increased use of food labeling and argues that
labeling is an ideal tool for countering the limitations faced by the FDA
in promoting good nutrition.3 This argument is supported by tracing the
strong statutory basis for the FDA’s authority over labeling, which has
been reinforced by legislation such as the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). The effects of the NLEA are then
examined, including the standardization of labels, which has helped
mitigate the effects of a fragmented food regulatory system by
consolidating power with the FDA. The usefulness of this incremental
approach, which relies on labeling, is then discussed by reviewing a 2016
rule that the FDA released which updated the original nutrition panel with
a mandatory “added sugar” disclosure.
Finally, Part IV proposes additional incremental changes that the FDA
could implement to build on the 2016 rule on added sugar, and to promote
more informed decision-making by consumers.4 This Article advocates
for front-of-label solutions that are meant to serve as a “nudge” for
consumers. These nudges could include clear visual indicators for
products that contain an excessive amount of non-nutritious ingredients,
such as sugar or salt.

1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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I. THE FDA’S ORIGINAL MANDATE TO ADDRESS FOOD SAFETY
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a federal
agency that was originally tasked primarily with enforcing hygienic and
sanitary food quality standards.5 The parameters of that authority are set
out by a series of broad statutes that have been interpreted by judicial
decisions and further legislation.6 The FDA’s early history in regulating
food safety provides a reference point with which to contrast the
challenges the FDA now faces in attempting to regulate nutritional health
risks.
A. Historical Origins of the FDA
Agricultural safety in the United States has been monitored since the
mid-1800s by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).7
However, the start of the modern, consumer-oriented era of food
regulation, overseen by the FDA and the USDA, came into existence in
only 1906.8 That year, Congress enacted the Federal Meat Inspection Act
(FMIA), which empowered the modern USDA, as well as the Pure Food
and Drugs Act (PFDA), which empowered the modern FDA to regulate
misbranding and adulteration.9 These landmark Acts were passed in the
wake of outcries over Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, which documented
the disturbingly unsanitary conditions in American meat factories.10
Sinclair’s account prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to
commission his own investigation, which resulted in a damning report,
despite frantic cleanup efforts by the meat packing industry.11 The rising
public pressure compelled Congress to act, leading to the passage of these
two monumental 1906 acts—FMIA and PFDA—by a landslide.12 These
two acts laid the framework for the modern FDA and USDA.13
5. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA FUNDAMENTALS (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/
about-fda/fda-basics/fda-fundamentals [https://perma.cc/3XE6-UKB8]; see U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN, WHEN AND WHY WAS FDA FORMED? (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/fda-basics/when-and-why-was-fda-formed [https://perma.cc/H2DS-XJKC].
6. See discussion infra Parts I.B, I.C.
7. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA HISTORY, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history
[https://perma.cc/3R4K-Z6K5] (last visited June 29, 2018).
8. Id.
9. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD & DRUG LAW,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history/milestones-us-food-and-drug-law [https://perma.cc/
36F3-VV82] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
10. James Harvey Young, The Pig That Fell into the Privy: Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle
and the Meat Inspection Amendments of 1906, 59 BULL. HIST. MED. 467, 470, 476 (1985).
11. Id. at 475–76 (describing stomach-churning conditions in a factory where a pig that slid
into a latrine was fished out, only to be returned to the production line, after it had passed the
cleaning stage).
12. See WHEN AND WHY WAS FDA FORMED?, supra note 5; MILESTONES, supra note 9.
13. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS: THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT,
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Over the past century, the FDA has grown much larger to keep up
with the sprawling food industry. The FDA now consists of nine centerlevel offices and thirteen headquarter offices.14 The FDA regulates all
food, except meat, poultry, and some egg products.15 The FDA defines
itself as a “science-based agency,” which is reflected in its guidance of
the food industry, and it claims to be insulated from political pressures.16
The structure of the modern FDA, with its limited authority, is a result of
a handful of statutes and judicial decisions.
B. Legislative Development of the FDA’s Statutory Authority
Food safety legislation began with the Federal Meat Inspection Act
(FMIA) and the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA) in 1906.17 Over the last
century, Congress has added countless amendments and pieces of
legislation, but the most comprehensive was the 1938 Food Drug and
Cosmetics Act (FDCA).18
The FDCA filled in many of the gaps from the PFDA in 1906, which
it replaced. The FDCA authorized standards for the identification and
quality of products, as well as making court injunctions a viable remedy
for enforcement.19 The FDCA also introduced major changes, such as
labeling requirements, which reflected the FDA’s evolving role and its
attempt to stay ahead of the rapidly developing food industry.20 Congress
drafted the FDCA in broad language and empowered the FDA to enforce
prohibitions on products that are “injurious to health,” as well as products
that are “false or misleading in any particular.”21 Supporters of an
expansive role for the FDA saw this language as providing a great deal
of additional authority, while for challengers it provided fodder for claims
of ambiguity as to the scope of the FDA’s power. Some FDA officials in
the decades since the enactment of the FDCA have interpreted the
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/Pure-Food-and-Drug-Act/
[https://
perma.cc/5MRZ-V2EM] (showing that the Pure Food and Drugs Act was passed by a vote of 204
to 17 on June 23, 1906) (last visited July 28, 2021).
14. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA ORGANIZATION CHARTS, https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/fda-organization/fda-organization-charts [https://perma.cc/2FB3-EM9C] (last visited Dec.
13, 2019).
15. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LAWS ENFORCED BY FDA, https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/laws-enforced-fda [https://perma.cc/7VK5-SRWL] (last visited Dec. 13, 2019).
16. Rebecca L. Goldberg, Administering Real Food: How the Eat-Food Movement Should-And Should Not--Approach Government Regulation, 39 ECOLOGY L. Q. 773, 787 (2012).
17. MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 79 (2016).
18. MILESTONES, supra note 9.
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 341–50 (2018); MILESTONES, supra note 9.
20. Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2, 62 (1984).
21. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 101, 102 (1995) (letter by the then Assistant General Counsel
for the FDA in 1971); 21 U.S.C. §§ 342–43.

432

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 31

agency’s mandate to protect public health broadly as authorization to
promulgate regulations that provide creative and innovative food safety
solutions.22
Congress has periodically enacted new legislation as the food
landscape changes. When the public’s interest in nutrition heightened in
the 1960s, the FDA began to rely increasingly on regulation through
labeling.23 That trend towards labeling was initially codified through
major acts such as the 1966 Fair Packaging and Labeling Act to regulate
labels on goods shipped interstate.24 That 1966 Act was later reinforced
by the 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), which
required all foods to bear labels and preempted portions of state
authority.25
In practice, the FDA is often constrained by its limited budget and by
the need to please both the public and the food industry while not
overstepping boundaries set by Congress and the judiciary.26 The result
is that the FDA often acts responsively, rather than proactively, by acting
only when a situation becomes urgent.27 Thus, the courts have
adjudicated some food safety issues that could have been better addressed
by the FDA.28
C. Judicial Interpretation of Food Safety Laws
To understand how the FDA can best create solutions for modern
nutrition issues, it is important to understand the way in which the FDA’s
actions have been limited by the courts. Not long after the passage of the
1938 Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a critical piece of legislation that
acted as a check on administrative agencies.29 The APA provided, in part,
that litigants had a right to judicial review when “suffering legal wrong

22. Hutt, supra note 21, at 102 (letter from 1971 by Peter Barton Hutt, the Assistant General
Counsel at the time, who wrote “I am not at all certain that the Food and Drug Administration has
begun to explore the full reaches of existing statutory authority.”).
23. ROBERTS, supra note 17, at 4.
24. MILESTONES, supra note 9.
25. Id. (NLEA standardized certain food terms, preempting state power to regulate terms
like “low fat”).
26. See Andrea T. Borchers et al., The History and Contemporary Challenges of the US
Food and Drug Administration, 29 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 1, 2 (2007); 5 U.S.C. § 801; see, e.g.,
RENEE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM: A
PRIMER 10 (2016) (noting that FDA in 2012 said it would need an additional 400 to 450 million
dollars to effectuate the changes from the FSMA).
27. Borchers, supra note 26, at 1.
28. Hutt & Hutt II, supra note 20, at 72; Hutt, supra note 21, at 105.
29. ROBERTS, supra note 17, at 18.
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because of agency action, or adversely affected . . . by agency action.”30
This legislation provided the basis for judicial review of agency actions.
Early decisions by the Supreme Court, starting in the 1950s, revealed
a tendency towards a liberal construction in the authority of
administrative bodies, particularly with regard to food and drug law and
the need to protect the consumer.31 That liberal line of thinking was
somewhat inconsistently followed by circuit courts that interpreted the
scope of the 1938 Food Drug and Cosmetics Act.32 However, in 1984, in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,33 the
Supreme Court increased the power of federal agencies by holding that
courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes.34
There are two key principles that modern courts typically rely on to
adjudicate challenges to agency powers: (1) Title 5 U.S.C. § 706 prohibits
regulation that is “arbitrary [and] capricious;”35 and (2) Chevron further
clarifies that courts must defer to agency interpretation when the scope of
an agency’s power is unclear.36
Thus, while the APA gives litigants the right to seek redress for
oversteps by administrative agencies, the bar is fairly high, and agency
actions are presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise.37 Despite some
mixed results in the lower courts, the Supreme Court has ruled in favor
30. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
31. See 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S.
593, 596 (1951) (“By the Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768, as successively strengthened, Congress
exerted its power to keep impure and adulterated foods and drugs out of the channels of
commerce. The purposes of this legislation, we have said, ‘touch phases of the lives and health of
people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.”).
32. See, e.g., Int’l Nutrition, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 676 F.2d 338,
341 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding “Remedial legislation, such as the [Food Drug and Cosmetics] Act,
should be given a liberal construction consistent with its statutory purpose”; United States v. Nova
Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Yet, when we are dealing with the
public health, the language of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act should not be read too
restrictively, but rather as ‘consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to protect the public
health’”).
33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34. Id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing in part that courts “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law”).
36. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (finding that a “court must defer
under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of
the agency's statutory authority”)) There have also been recent challenges to Chevron though, see
Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed by the House,
attempting to reign in Chevron Deference as a violation of the separation of powers).
37. Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355,
1356 (2016).
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of agency actions on challenges of arbitrariness in over ninety percent of
cases, as of 2016.38 A broad view of the purpose of the FDCA—which
gives the FDA greater latitude—was specifically endorsed in a recent
2014 case in which the Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he FDCA statutory
regime is designed primarily to protect the health and safety of the public
at large,”39 which is in line with previous non-restrictive readings of the
FDCA.40
Because of Chevron, the courts have not been a significant obstacle to
FDA actions in recent years. The more pointed limitations that the FDA
faces now come from Congress, which responds to both industry
lobbyists and consumers, who often underestimate dietary health risks.
II. THE FDA’S CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF NUTRITION
Upton Sinclair’s spotlight on food preparation and production in the
early 1900s lifted a curtain into the unseemly world of unsanitary food
and patently false advertising and sparked sixty years of food safety
legislation.41 Starting in the late 1950s a new focus emerged, led by
nutrition scientists, concerning the nutrient quality of food in American
diets and the overconsumption of particular ingredients, such as fat and
sugar.42 Just as unsanitary food issues had eventually caught the attention
of President Theodore Roosevelt, protecting consumers from dietary
risks caused by malnutrition was eventually addressed by President John
F. Kennedy. In a speech to Congress in 1962, President Kennedy laid out
the Consumer Bill of Rights noting that American consumers did not
know “whether one prepared food has more nutritional value than
another.”43
38. Id. at 1355.
39. POM Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 108 (2014).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir.
1977) (“Yet, when we are dealing with the public health, the language of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act should not be read too restrictively, but rather as ‘consistent with the Act’s
overriding purpose to protect the public health.’”). But see INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, ENHANCING FOOD SAFETY: THE ROLE OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 296
(Robert B. Wallace & Maria Oria eds., 2010) (arguing for new, more clearly defined legislation,
because the FDA may be more vulnerable to challenges, due to the ambiguity of broadly stated
statutory authority).
41. See supra discussion in Part I.B.
42. Dariush Mozaffarian et al., History of Modern Nutrition Science—Implications for
Current Research, Dietary Guidelines, and Food Policy, BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1–2 (2018),
https://www.bmj.com/content/361/bmj.k2392 [https://perma.cc/6AT2-Y7CN].
43. 108 CONG. REC. 4167–71 (1962) (statement of President Kennedy) (Kennedy outlining
rights in speech to Congress, such as the right to safety; to be protected against the marketing of
goods which are hazardous to health or life); see also Paul Diller, Combatting Obesity with a
Right to Nutrition, 101 GEO. L.J. 969, 975 (2013) (providing a modern formulation of the right to
nutrition under a constitutional basis).
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Unlike the regulation of unsanitary food, this new era of food
regulation, which focused on a healthy diet, did not catch hold as
quickly.44 The nutritional health issue was again addressed in 1969 during
the White House Conference on Food and Nutrition Health.45 These talks
laid the groundwork for hearings in Congress. The ensuing debates,
beginning in the 1970s, have continued today over the role of food
regulators in modifying American diets.46
Because everyone interacts with food daily, it is easy for decision
makers in power to believe that the solutions to diet-related health risks
are simple and intuitive. As a result, nutrition policy is often shaped by
one-dimensional oversimplification of the factors leading to poor dietary
health.47 For example, in the 1970s, as the public (and food industry
marketers) became increasingly focused on the content of their food,
there was a growing debate over whether fat or sugar was the primary
culprit contributing to poor diet.48 This oversimplified view left room for
only one target, which was fat, while sugar largely escaped notice and
criticism.49 This selection was reflected in the publication of Congress’s
first dietary guidelines in 1980, which focused on reducing fat in diets.50
At the same time, food regulators such as the FDA have tried to fill in the
gaps left by inadequate legislation regarding sugar, and have been met
with great resistance.51 That resistance comes from consumers who do
not fully understand the risks of their dietary choices within a greater
nutrition crisis, and from industry, which profits from the sale of
unhealthy foods.52
A. The Nutritional Health Crisis
In recent years, trends of nutritional deficiencies are emerging that can
be traced not to a lack of food altogether, but to the unavailability of
nutritious food. Many people have only nutrient-poor food options.53
While this paper focuses on trends within the United States, food
insecurity is a global problem, as are increasing rates of obesity and diet44. See Diller, supra note 43, at 975.
45. David Kessler, The Evolution of National Nutrition Policy, 15 ANN. REV. NUTRITION
xiii, xvi (1995).
46. Id.
47. Mozaffarian et al., supra note 42, at 1–5.
48. Id. at 1–2.
49. Id. Some saw this as a result of industry influence.
50. Kessler, supra note 45.
51. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, The Bittersweet Truth About Sugar Labeling Regulations:
They are Achievable and Overdue, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e14, e14, e16 (2012).
52. See Mozaffarian et al., supra note 42, at 5.
53. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION
IN THE WORLD 90 (2019), http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/ [https://perma
.cc/L4WN-GPBP] (FAO report examining the state of food security and nutrition worldwide).
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related disease.54 Perhaps most troubling, the prevalence of high-calorie,
low-nutrient processed foods has been linked to higher rates of child
obesity.55 Joint studies by world health organizations have linked dietary
health diseases with greater access to processed foods.56
1. Impact of Processed Foods
The United States has been hit particularly hard by the epidemic of
malnutrition and the associated comorbidities such as obesity—which
affected 42.4% of Americans as of 2021.57 The increase in obesity is
particularly pronounced in the youth population.58 Americans now live in
an environment characterized by an overabundance of food that is low in
nutrient value but high in calories.59 The rise in these nutrient-deficient,
processed foods is often attributed, in part, to the role of the government
in propping up agricultural producers.60
The culprit in the rise in malnutrition may be not only the increase in
processed foods, but also what these processed foods are replacing. The
Center for Disease Control found that less than ten percent of Americans
were getting their recommended daily value of fruits and vegetables.61
54. Id. In 2018, 1.3 billion people experienced “moderate food insecurity” globally, which
is characterized in part by the need to choose nutritionally inferior food products.
55. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF) ET AL., LEVELS AND TRENDS IN CHILD
MALNUTRITION 2 (2019), https://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/jme-2019-key-findings.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/R8MF-BJDR] (2019 report on trends in child malnutrition. Just since 2000, the
number of overweight children grew by 10 million).
56. Id. The report also identifies marketing reach and decreases in physical activity as
contributors.
57. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADULT OBESITY FACTS,
https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html [https://perma.cc/K4ST-XRHF] (last visited Jan. 26,
2021) (CDC on rising rates of obesity in the United States).
58. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CHILDHOOD OBESITY FACTS,
https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html [https://perma.cc/GLN3-WFZX] (last visited
July 29, 2021).
59. Deborah L. Rhode, Obesity and Public Policy: A Roadmap for Reform, 22 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 491, 496 (2015).
60. Id. However, the common thinking that oversupply of processed foods may be
attributed specifically to subsidies has been challenged by a recent literature review arguing that
overproduction would occur even without subsidies, and thus do not affect the consumer prices.
The authors theorize that subsidies benefit the farmers and don’t cheapen the products. They
conclude that the overproduction is a result of deregulation of standardized price, which incentives
overproduction by small and midsized farmers to hedge their risk, because they cannot adjust the
growth of their crops to match market shifts. FOOD & WATER WATCH & PUB. HEALTH INST., DO
FARM SUBSIDIES CAUSE OBESITY?: DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE
FARM BILL 3–4 (2011), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FarmSubsidies-Obesity-Report-Oct-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/88LU-Q2WN]. Regardless of the
cause of increased processed food production, the baseline assumption—that there is a ubiquity
of processed foods in the United States—remains undisputed.
61. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MAKING HEALTHY EATING EASIER,
https://www.cdc.gov/nutrition/about-nutrition/pdfs/Nutrition-Fact-Sheet-H.pdf [https://perma.cc
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That diet deficiency has taken its toll on American health for the last
several decades, leading to “dietary risk” becoming the leading factor for
mortality in the United States as of 2016.62
2. Overconsumption of Sugar and Associated Health Effects
While nutritional deficiencies are generally the result of many
lifestyle and dietary decisions, sugar has been consistently identified as a
major contributor to poor health.63 In particular, many Americans
consume excessive amounts of sugar through their consumption of sugarsweetened beverages.64 Because sugar is such a major source of calories
for Americans, many studies have been conducted on its effect. These
studies have found that sugar promotes weight gain, among other
deleterious effects.65 With the connection of sugar to chronic disease now
apparent, many prominent health organizations have recommended
reductions in the intake of sugar in American diets, generally capping
consumption at ten percent of daily calories.66 Despite clear guidance,
Americans continue to consume far too much sugar.67 The cause of
/UCP3-S6BF] (last visited Dec. 13, 2019) (CDC Division working from local to national level to
encourage healthier eating).
62. The US Burden of Disease Collaborators, The State of US Health, 1990-2016: Burden
of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Among US States, 319 JAMA 1444, 1451, 1469 (2018)
(“Dietary Risk” was found to be the leading factor for death, as it was a factor in over half a
million deaths in 2016. Dietary risk was assessed in part by questions that gauged the amount of
fruits and vegetables individuals consumed.).
63. Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar-sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain in Children and
Adults: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 98 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1084, 1084
(2013).
64. Id. (Sugar sweetened beverages remain the top source of calories for Americans, despite
modest decreases between 2000 and 2008 in consumption.).
65. Id. at 1084 (systematic meta-analysis of 32 different medical studies through March of
2013 found consumption of sugar associated with weight gain); see also WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION GUIDELINE: SUGARS INTAKE FOR ADULTS AND CHILDREN 3 (2015) (Reduced sugar
intake is associated with body weight reduction. Sugar is also associated with dental cavities.);
Miriam B. Vos et al., Added Sugars and Cardiovascular Disease Risk in Children: A Scientific
Statement From the American Heart Association, AM. HEART ASS’N J., May 9, 2017, at e1018,
e1022, e1024 (AHA concludes there is strong evidence of cardiovascular disease risk among
children with high consumption of sugary beverages).
66. See Rachel K. Johnson et al., Dietary Sugars Intake and Cardiovascular Health, AM.
HEART ASS’N J., Sept. 15, 2009, at 1011, https://ahajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1161/circulationaha.
109.192627 [https://perma.cc/DGV2-VAHH]; see also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
GUIDELINE: SUGARS INTAKE FOR ADULTS AND CHILDREN 3 (2015) (recommending sugar intake be
limited to 10% of daily energy intake).
67. See Linda Searing, The Big Number: Americans Consume 17 Teaspoons of Added Sugar
Daily. That’s Way too Much, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
health/the-big-number-americans-consume-17-teaspoons-of-added-sugar-daily-thats-way-toomuch/2019/11/01/318c9f6e-fbed-11e9-8190-6be4deb56e01_story.html [https://perma.cc/3Y9GR73F].
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misunderstanding and lack of awareness about the risks.68
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B. Low Consumer Awareness—Requires a New Education Effort
Despite the high rates of mortality from diet-related risks, consumers
continue to choose unhealthy products.69 Food experts hypothesize that
this may be due to the average consumer’s limited ability to assess the
effect that the foods they consume will have on their health and weight.70
After all, less than one of every ten Americans can accurately assess the
amount of calories they should be consuming daily,71 and over ninety
percent of people underestimate the number of calories in unhealthy
foods.72
With such a wide array of products on the market, consumers are
simply unable to keep track of which products are healthy.73 Even when
consumers are paying attention while shopping for their young children,
they often choose products with high levels of sugar and salt; parents
make these poor choices, in part, because they are unable to assess the
nutritional value from front labels that misdirect them with vague health
claims.74 The toddlers consuming these unhealthy products may see up
to 800 advertisements for junk food annually, shaping their attitude
towards food products and brands when their associations are most
malleable.75
This limited decision-making ability of consumers, coupled with the
inundation of processed foods that are aggressively advertised and
promoted, has created a perfect storm for malnutrition to thrive.76
Agencies, such as the FDA, have had difficulty responding to this crisis
due to the disaggregated nature of food regulation and due to political
barriers.77

68. Id. (noting that “sugars are often present in foods not thought of as sweetened: soups,
bread, cured meats, and ketchup”).
69. Id.
70. Rhode, supra note 59, at 499.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Catherine Boudreau, Why We Don’t Know what to Eat to Stay Healthy, POLITICO (Nov.
1, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/11/01/why-we-dontknow-what-to-eat-to-stay-healthy-781975 [https://perma.cc/H9SU-EB2A].
74. Laura Reiley, Sweet Excess: How the Baby Food Industry Hooks Toddlers on Sugar,
Salt and Fat, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/
10/17/sweet-excess-how-baby-food-industry-hooks-toddlers-sugar-salt-fat/ [https://perma.cc/TZ
T9-6SE3].
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
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C. Bureaucratic Obstacles to Sweeping Changes by the FDA
Efforts to regulate nutrition can take many forms, from the most
intrusive, such as outright bans of unhealthy foods, to less restrictive
options, such as required disclosures, education, and restrictions on
marketing to children.78 The FDA has a key role in the regulation of
nutrition but struggles to balance consumer protection with industry
demands.79 As the National Research Council explained: “Although food
safety is the responsibility of everyone, from producers to consumers, the
FDA and other regulatory agencies have an essential role. In many
instances, the FDA must carry out this responsibility against a backdrop
of multiple stakeholder interests, inadequate resources, and competing
priorities.”80
In attempting to navigate this gauntlet of competing interests, the FDA
has seen mixed results. Its power has been expanded in some areas, such
as labeling, where it appears to be making steady progress, most notably
with the passage of the 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act.81
However, in other areas, the FDA’s authority has been severely restricted,
such as with the passage of the 1994 Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act,82 which prohibits the FDA from regulating supplements
as drugs.83 One major obstacle in addressing nutritional health is the lack
of coordination with other agencies, such as the USDA, which may also
have different stakeholders, such as farmers.84
1. Limited by Operating Within a Fragmented Food Regulatory System
In the United States, there is a complex web of local, state, and federal
overseers that seek to protect consumers by regulating the trillion-dollar
food industry.85 The sprawling regulatory system has been repeatedly
examined by outside government accountability offices over the past four
decades and found to be highly fragmented and lacking in cohesion.86
That fragmentation creates both redundancy and uncertainty in legislative
78. See Rhode, supra note 59, at 493.
79. See INST. MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 40.
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 433.
82. Id. at 27–28.
83. See infra Part II.C.2.ii discussion on caps and DSHEA.
84. See Rhode, supra note 59, at 30.
85. See JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 1 (providing an overview of the regulatory bodies and
legislative jurisdiction within congress for food safety).
86. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-74, FOOD SAFETY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY
IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION IN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 3 (2017) [hereinafter GAO
FRAGMENTATION REPORT] (examining the U.S. food regulatory system, with main findings that it
is highly fragmented, and recommending a national strategy to address this issue, potentially led
by the Executive Office of the President).
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attempts to regulate food safety.87 Furthermore, agency responses to
crises such as malnutrition and the obesity epidemic are handicapped
when uncertainty as to the extent of the agency’s power prevents them
from taking effective action.88 Food safety has been labeled a “high-risk”
area due to the lack of coordination, leaving regulatory agencies
vulnerable to fraud and mismanagement.89
Food in the United States is regulated by at least sixteen federal
agencies and is mainly governed by thirty different federal laws—not to
mention the myriad state and local agencies and ordinances.90 The system
of oversight extends to a variety of contexts, from the Federal Trade
Commission for regulating the advertising of food, to the Center for
Disease Control for foodborne illness management, and even to the
National Marine Fisheries Service, which has power over the labeling of
seafood.91 These examples illustrate the breadth of regulatory jurisdiction
among administrative agencies overseeing food safety, with many of the
agencies playing a relatively minor role.
The two main pillars of food safety protection are the USDA, via its
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and the FDA, which falls
under the Department of Health and Human Services.92 The USDA, via
FSIS, handles the regulation of meat and poultry while the FDA is
responsible for regulating the safety of all other food.93 Thus, the FDA is
responsible for regulating 80 to 90 percent of the U.S. food supply while
FSIS is responsible for the remaining 10 to 20 percent.94 However,
despite the FDA’s significantly larger scope, the FDA’s budget was
approximately 20 percent smaller than that of FSIS in 2016.95 Congress
appears to have recognized this discrepancy, and momentum is building
towards making the funding more proportionate to the scope of the
agencies’ oversight.96 Thus, that 20 percent gap has since disappeared,
and the FDA budget has exceeded the FSIS budget from 2019 to 2021.97
87. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 14 (congressional committees often uncertain as to who has
jurisdiction on a given food law issue, leading to duplication and overlaps).
88. But see INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 7–8 (advising rollout
of new “risk-based” systematic approach of identifying and addressing the most urgent food safety
issues but acknowledging that current fragmentation would be an impediment and recommending
the integration of federal, state and local food systems).
89. GAO FRAGMENTATION REPORT, supra note 86, at 4.
90. Id. at 6; JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 5 (FDA works with over 400 state agencies
nationwide).
91. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 2, 7; GAO FRAGMENTATION REPORT, supra note 86, at 6–7.
92. GAO FRAGMENTATION REPORT, supra note 86, at 6.
93. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 1–2.
94. GAO FRAGMENTATION REPORT, supra note 86, at 20 n.50.
95. Id.
96. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 9.
97. Amber D. Nair, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46851, FY2020 and FY2021 Agricultural
Appropriations: Federal Food Safety Activities 3 tbl. 1 (2021).
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a. Influence of Agriculture Interests
While the regulatory jurisdictions of the FDA and USDA are mostly
discrete, oversight of these two main agencies by Congress has been
consolidated. Both agencies are overseen and have their funding
administered by the Agriculture Subcommittee within Congress.98 The
fact that the Agriculture Subcommittee wields this power over funding is
an institutionalized example of the deeply entrenched principle that the
solvency of American farmers is paramount when executing food law and
policy.99 Thus, a linkage has developed between food assistance
programs and supporting agricultural producers, which helps explain why
the USDA (tasked primarily with food production) administers the
Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), rather than the
FDA (tasked primarily with public health and food supply safety).100
A partial reconfiguration of the bifurcated system might reassign food
programs, such as SNAP, to the FDA. SNAP is currently administered
by the USDA’s subgroup, known as the Food and Nutrition Service,
whose mission statement lists two potentially competing goals: “reduce
hunger by providing children and low-income people access to food
[and] . . . a healthful diet,” and doing so “in a way that supports American
agriculture.”101 A question for further scholarly exploration is what
happens when the two goals conflict, and whether the FDA might not be
subject to such competing pressures. Either way, the bifurcated
responsibility provides an obstacle to the FDA in responding to the
nutrition crisis with sweeping action, because the FDA has typically had
difficulty coordinating with an entirely different agency. While there is a
recognition of the problems inherent in the USDA-FDA bifurcated
system of food safety oversight, that division has existed since the
beginning of the modern era of food regulation and has been repeatedly
re-endorsed by legislators.102

98. Id. at 13–14.
99. See JACOB E. GERSEN ET AL., FOOD LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 650–51 (Rachel E.
Barkow et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the linkage between buying surplus food from American
farmers and hunger programs, codified in the Emergency Food Assistance Program, as part of a
deeply rooted connection between farmers and the administration of nutritional assistance).
100. Id. at 651; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA STRATEGIC GOALS,
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/usda-strategic-goals-2018-updated-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MS6-H5GL] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021) (USDA Strategic goals for 2108–
2022 focused mostly on producers); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT WE DO,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/VGA8-AXBM] (last visited Jan. 7,
2021) (FDA mission statement focused on public health).
101. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., ABOUT FNS, https://www.fns.usda.
gov/about-fns [https://perma.cc/F6YD-KX37] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
102. See JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 2–3.
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b. Dietary Guidelines
The paradigm of this disjointed regulatory system is the national
dietary guidelines, which direct the FDA’s nutritional priorities, but are
created by the USDA.103 These guidelines have been released every five
years by the USDA since 1980.104 While the guide purports to reflect only
the “current body of nutrition science” to help “guide Americans to make
healthy food and beverage choice,” the reality is that millions of dollars
are spent by major food conglomerates in lobbying during their
creation.105 Furthermore, because the USDA’s priorities are intertwined
with those of farmers and suppliers, the USDA sometimes supports
perverse or misleading guidelines that represent compromises not fully
aligned with the FDA’s nutritional health initiatives.106 However, the
USDA’s formulation of dietary guidelines is not the only process subject
to industry influence. All food policies must make their way through the
political process, subject to both industry and consumer demands.
2. Political Feasibility Limits from Industry and Consumers
Despite the mounting scientific evidence of the health costs imposed
by dietary risks, the FDA still faces resistance from Congress against its
attempts to regulate nutrition. This is because Congress is influenced by
103. AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43733, REVISION OF THE NUTRITION
(2014) (guidelines are created by a panel of nutrition experts
and form the basis for nutrition policy).
104. Barbara O. Schneeman, Evolution of Dietary Guidelines, 103 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 5–
9 (2003).
105. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ABOUT THE DIETARY GUIDELINES PURPOSE,
https://health.gov/our-work/food-nutrition/about-dietary-guidelines [https://perma.cc/P3LY-PT
YQ] (Dec. 29, 2020); see, e.g., Markham Heid, Experts Say Lobbying Skewed the Dietary
Guidelines, TIME (Jan. 8, 2016), https://time.com/4130043/lobbying-politics-dietary-guidelines/
(meat industry influence); Arielle Duhaime-Ross, New US Food Guidelines Show the Power of
Lobbying, Not Science, THE VERGE (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/1/7/
10726606/2015-us-dietary-guidelines-meat-and-soda-lobbying-power [https://perma.cc/5786TDUH] (on meat and soda conglomerate influence); Karen Perry Stillerman, “Big Food”
Companies Spend Big Money in Hopes of Shaping the Dietary Guidelines for Americans, UNION
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (June 6, 2019), https://blog.ucsusa.org/karen-perry-stillerman/big-foodcompanies-spend-big-money-in-hopes-of-shaping-the-dietary-guidelines-for-americans [https://
perma.cc/S4AU-96WR] (on food companies spending many millions of dollars to effect decisionmaking).
106. See, e.g., Michael R. Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Resources for the Future,
Address at the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) 10th Anniversary 39–40 (Jan. 31,
2003) (transcript available at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration website),
https://www.fda.gov/media/85806/download [https://perma.cc/3GZE-5JDY] (“[I]t was the label
that we had recommended, but with an interesting kind of compromise, and there is a compromise
in that label. The reason you’ve got the column of 2,000 and 2,500, you know, the nutrients—you
know what I’m talking about. I forgot. But where we show the daily value of fat and other nutrients
under a 2,000- and 2,500-calorie scenario is, I believe, the President or the staff knew a way of
cutting the baby with USDA…. We won, I think, on ‘lite.’ We lost on restaurants.”).
FACTS LABEL: PROPOSED RULES 1–3
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industry lobbyists and consumer opinion. Because the FDA’s statutory
authority is phrased fairly broadly, its authority to regulate nutrition has
mostly been derived from their mandate to protect public health and was
only formally reinforced in 1990 with the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act.107 Thus, the FDA has had to find the limits of their power
by trial and error. This process has shown that, while some efforts might
have been effective health interventions if implemented, they were
politically infeasible and may have created backlash that limited the
FDA’s later ability to intervene on nutrition concerns. Hence, the solution
proposed in this Article is for the FDA to take a more cautious approach
through incremental change. The following two subsections trace
previous attempts to regulate that are illustrative of the risks to the FDA’s
authority from implementing interventions that both the public and
industry perceive as overly restrictive. The first was a ban on saccharine,
and the second was a limit on dietary supplements.
a. Ban on Artificial Sweeteners
In the 1970s, studies on artificial sweeteners, such as saccharine,
indicated a risk of a carcinogenic effect on rats—which later studies
hypothesized might similarly affect humans.108 The FDA attempted to
respond to this potential threat by removing saccharine from the list of
ingredients that it deemed “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS)—an
expansive list of ingredients that do not require pre-market approval by
the FDA.109 The FDA was able to use this reclassification as a tool to
monitor temporarily the risks posed by saccharine until they could more
conclusively prove its safety.110
A few years later, alarmed by the possible link to cancer, the FDA
attempted to implement a full ban on saccharine in the market.111 The ban
lasted for about a week.112 After extensive public outcry, the FDA’s
authority was curtailed and the Senate passed the Saccharine Study and
107. Kessler, supra note 45, at 20.
108. See, e.g., P.G.N. Kramers, The Mutagenecity of Saccharin, 32 MUTATION RES. 81 (1975)
(finding mixed results in review of 17 studies of saccharin on mutagenicity); see also Melvin
Dwaine Reuber, Carinogenicity of Saccharine, 25 ENV. HEALTH PERSPS. 173 (1978) (National
Institute of Health study showing carcinogenic effects of saccharine on rats, which indicated
potential effects for human consumption as well).
109. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS SAFE (GRAS),
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-ingredients-packaging/generally-recognized-safe-gras [https://
perma.cc/ZVA3-4SXR] (last visited Dec. 13, 2019); Harold M. Schmeck Jr., F.D.A. Removes
Saccharin from List of Safe Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1972, at 27.
110. Id.
111. Schmeck, supra note 109, at 27.
112. Jesse Hicks, The Pursuit of Sweet: A History of Saccharine, CHEM. HERITAGE MAG.,
May 2, 2010, at 31 (Congress received over a million letters that week about the ban prompting
swift action and the passage of the Saccharine Study and Labeling Act).
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Labeling Act of 1977, which placed a two-year moratorium on bans of
saccharine.113 While the FDA has occasionally been successful in
complete bans, such as in the more recent efforts with trans fats, that
success has only come after conclusive evidence of health risks, a
sustained public education effort, willingness from the public, and
cooperation with industry.114
b. Supplements and DSHEA Response
Limitations on the production of certain products, or on the claims
printed on the products, are among the most restrictive options the FDA
can use. Attempts to use these restrictions did not fare well when applied
to the massively popular dietary supplement market. The effort began in
1962, following a wave of increased attention about dietary health.115 The
FDA first tried to place limits on dietary supplements that contained high
levels of vitamins.116 That effort quickly drew industry and consumer
attention, and the FDA backed down after intense consumer protest.117
Undeterred, the FDA continued to monitor dietary supplements,
expressing renewed interest in the 1970s in the regulation of potentially
toxic overuse of supplements.118 However, in 1976, in response to
sustained lobbying efforts, Congress passed the Vitamin-Mineral
Amendment (known as the “Proxmire Amendment” after a leading
senator) which prevented the FDA from regulating supplements as a
drug, regardless of potency.119
Finally, the FDA efforts came to a head in the 1980s, following
several adverse health incidents linked to supplements. A single
supplement containing L-Tryptophan caused 1,500 cases of illnesses and
39 deaths.120 Following these incidents, and with expanded authority
from the passage of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) in
1990, the FDA started putting together a task force in 1991 to treat
113. Id.
114. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TRANS FAT: THE FACTS, https://cchealth.org/eh/food/pdf/
Trans-Fat-The-Facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B4W-5G6P] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021); U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., TRANS FAT, https://www.fda.gov/food/food-additives-petitions/trans-fat
[https://perma.cc/A2MH-NBYK] (last visited Dec. 13, 2019) (FDA on history of trans fat
regulation leading to ban in 2018, with leeway for industry to comply by 2020).
115. Azizi Rahi, “Supplement” the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with Greater
Regulatory Authority over Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending the Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act, 98 CAL. L. REV. 439, 442 (2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive Biases, Market
Manipulation & Consumer Choice, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 238 (2005).
120. See DONNA V. PORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30887, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS:
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY STATUS 2 (2002).
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supplements as drugs for approval.121 When the supplement industry
learned of this effort, a massive grassroots campaign was initiated to call
for greater restrictions on the FDA’s authority.122 The result was the
enactment in 1994 of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
(DSHEA). The DSHEA was widely viewed as restricting the FDA’s
authority over supplements. The DSHEA explicitly prohibited the rollout
of the NLEA to supplements because they were not considered equivalent
to food for regulatory oversight.123
Despite demonstrative evidence that the majority of consumers view
dietary supplements as a substitute for drugs, DSHEA was enacted,
specifically preventing the regulation of dietary supplements as drugs. 124
The DSHEA also shifted the burden to the FDA to prove that the
supplements are not safe or effective, rather than requiring the industry
to prove their safety and efficacy.125 Thus, supplement regulation serves
as a sobering example of FDA action that did not yet have sufficient
support to override industry power and consumer preferences.
3. Limitations from Budgetary Constraints
Finally, in addition to the limitations from operating with a
fragmented regulatory environment and from parameters set by
Congress, the FDA’s power is also limited simply by its budget.
Furthermore, nutrition represents a disproportionately small percentage
of the FDA’s budget, at just 2%, while food safety is allocated the
remaining 98%—which is one billion dollars.126 The overall budget
shortfall remains a problem today, as evidenced by the underfunding of
the most recent major piece of legislation, the 2011 Food Safety and
Modernization Act (FSMA).
The FSMA was a major statutory expansion of the FDA’s power,
which passed the political gauntlet. The FSMA was enacted by Congress
to better control food poisoning outbreaks, and it is viewed as one of the
most consequential pieces of legislation in food law since the Pure Food
121. See Rahi, supra note 115, at 443.
122. See PORTER, supra note 120, at 4 (grassroots efforts mobilized health supplement
industry all over the country, even offering discounts on products for supporting letters and
petitions).
123. See id. at 3; see also United States v. Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d 814, 819 (7th Cir.
1993) (similarly restricting FDA authority over supplements by holding that black currant oil, as
part of a supplement, was not a food additive and thus supplier did not bear burden of proving its
safety).
124. See McCann, supra note 119, at 221 (citing studies indicating that 80% of consumers
took supplements as a substitute for drugs).
125. Rahi, supra note 115, at 441.
126. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF, GAO-18-174, FOOD SAFETY AND NUTRITION:
FDA CAN BUILD ON EXISTING EFFORTS TO MEASURE PROGRESS AND IMPLEMENT KEY ACTIVITIES
(2017).
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and Drug Act of 1938.127 Despite the ambitious goals laid out in the
FSMA, the FDA has been slow to roll out a similarly ambitious plan,
likely due, in part, to a budget shortfall of over $400 million to make the
changes.128 Given these practical economic constraints, an economically
efficient model is sorely needed.
III. FDA’S SHIFT TO LABELING AS AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO
IMPROVING NUTRITION
As Part I one of this Article discussed, the FDA has a variety of tools
available within the broad mandate of protecting public health that
originated with revelations about food safety at the turn of the twentieth
century. In the modern era of food regulation (in the last fifty years), the
concern with public health has taken on new dimensions, moving beyond
the original protections against contamination and adulteration and on to
nutritional quality.
This part examines the origins of food labeling, the most effective tool
for combatting nutritional deficiencies in an age of abundant processed
foods and consumer ignorance. Labeling is an incremental approach that
addresses the problems laid out in Part II because it is politically favored,
insulated from the challenges of a disaggregated system by uniform
labels, and is the best tool for educating consumers.
A. FDA Has Clear Authority Over Labeling
Previous efforts to regulate goods that the public or industry opposed
have faced pushback from Congress, resulting in limitations to the FDA’s
powers.129 Hence, there is a need to make political calculations when
choosing the best tool by examining which tools have been endorsed by
Congress and accepted by consumers. Over the last few decades,
Congress has favored labeling. The next section traces the development
of that labeling authority, which the FDA can wield as a more effective
approach than other regulatory approaches because it is politically
favored.
127. See AMANDA HEMMERICH ET AL., FARM & FOOD LAW: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS IN THE
LEGAL SERVICES FOOD HUB NETWORK 44 (MAINE ED. 2014), http://www.legalfoodhub.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Farm-and-Food-Law-Guide-Maine_May-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N3Z9-928S] (Congress expanded the FDA’s regulatory oversight to include farms that produce
raw produce, an area not previously in their purview, and the FSMA also created sweeping
changes for farmers heightening their responsibility for maintaining safety standards); see also
ROBERTS, supra note 17, at 8; MILESTONES, supra note 9 (much of the overall goal was to enhance
safety by integrating local and state regulation with federal oversight by the FDA).
128. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 10 (FDA reports in their 2012 budget that they would need
400 to 450 million dollars of additional funding to meet FSMA goals).
129. See generally Henry I. Miller, Failed FDA Reform, 21:3 REGULATION 24, 28–29 (1998),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1998/7/v21n3-ftr2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XLY7-BRUU].
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1. Origins and Development of Food Labeling Authority
The FDA has been the primary agency tasked with labeling since the
passage of the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) in 1938. The
FDCA has been continually amended since 1938 with provisions to
ensure standards of identity for food to avoid misbranding.130 With the
heightened focus on nutritional health beginning in the 1960s, support for
labeling rose in tandem, as illustrated by President Kennedy’s address to
Congress outlining a Consumer Bill of Rights which included a labeling
right for a consumer to “be given the facts he needs to make an informed
choice.”131
This momentum carried through to 1966, when Congress enacted the
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA), which required that labels
include a standardized statement of identity, net quantity, and place of
origin.132 The Act placed labels that travelled in interstate commerce
under federal agency jurisdiction (primarily the Federal Trade
Commission and the FDA), and required that the labels be informative
and honest.133 In the 1970s, the FDA attempted to increase their
influence, as they did with other forms of regulation, but found greater
success in labeling than they had with attempts at outright bans or
limitations on products.134 Thus, the FDA was able to implement
nutrition-oriented changes such as the Nutrition Quality Guidelines for
popular items like frozen dinners, which were given an endorsement by
the federal government on the label if they met the nutrient content
criteria.135
The relative success of food labeling has led to its recognition as an
integral tool for public education by the FDA, which now considers
labeling a major tool in the mission to protect consumers. 136 Further,
subsequent amendments to acts such as the FDCA made clear that the
FDA would have the ultimate say in what labels passed muster.137 Food
130. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2018).
131. Kennedy, supra note 43.
132. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FAIR PACKAGING AND LABELING ACT: REGULATIONS UNDER
SECTION 4 OF THE FAIR PACKAGING AND LABELING ACT, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/rules/
rulemaking-regulatory-reform-proceedings/fair-packaging-labeling-act [https://perma.cc/S8SBN7BZ] (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (prohibiting unfair and deceptive packaging and requiring labels
to enable consumers to obtain accurate information about the quantity of contents); see also
MILESTONES, supra note 9.
134. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the failed attempts to ban saccharine and limit vitamin
composition and usage); Hutt & Hutt II, supra note 20, at 67–70.
135. Id. at 69.
136. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IS IT REALLY ‘FDA APPROVED?’, https://www.fda.gov/
consumers/consumer-updates/it-really-fda-approved [https://perma.cc/7U5X-EMPP] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2019); Kessler, supra note 45, at 20.
137. Margaret Rosso Grossman, Food Labels and Labeling in the United States, 10 EUR.
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would be considered mislabeled if it failed to meet regulatory
requirements set out by the FDA for both the principal display panel
(front of label) and information panel (side or back of label). 138 The
labeling requirements generally fall within two categories: affirmative
statement requirements and permissible claims.
2. Types of Label Requirements—Affirmative and Permissible Claims
The basic dichotomy of labeling is requirements for affirmative
statements (e.g., statement of identity, net quantity, and ingredients) and
standards for permissible claims (additional information that labels may
include).139 Affirmative requirements are less controversial—and subject
only to rational basis review by courts140—when the FDA requires
producers to include only information about their products, as opposed to
suppressing speech.141 For that reason, this Article focuses on
recommendations and analysis of affirmative requirements (also known
as compelled speech). Affirmative labeling represents an incremental
approach compared to outright bans and is more clearly within the bounds
of FDA jurisdiction.142
The permissibility of claims made by producers is the area where
much of the modern era of food litigation has taken place because of its
implications on the curtailment of the first amendment right to speech.143
Many of these disputes center on claims of health benefits asserted on the
labels of food, such as positive effects on a disease or general wellbeing

FOOD & FEED L. REV. 160, 160 (2015).
138. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 343.
139. ROBERTS, supra note 17, at 232.
140. Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WASH.
U. J. L. & POL’Y 53, 80 (2016) (explaining that as long as factual information is being compelled,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of
Ohio indicates rational basis review is the appropriate standard).
141. Id. at 54 (discussing a trend in regulation towards compelled speech on labels, in light
of the harsh review by the Supreme court for restrictions on commercial speech).
142. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (establishing the prevailing standard for affirmative (or “compelled”) speech of
rational basis review when “the State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in
commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant
include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial speech”).
143. There has been a long line of cases litigating the issue of commercial speech restriction
beginning with Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980),
the bedrock case laying out a four-part test for the evaluating whether a limitation infringes on the
right to commercial free speech:
1)
Threshold requirement that the content must not be inherently misleading
2)
Government must have a substantial interest
3)
Regulation must directly and materially advance the government’s goal
4)
The regulation must be narrowly tailored.
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made by producers trying to entice customers.144 Until the enactment of
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) in 1990, health claims
were heavily monitored and it was difficult for them to pass muster given
the stringent standard that they require pre-market approval in the same
way as drugs.145 A shift away from treating health claims for food with
the same standard as health claims for drugs is just one of the many
changes that was introduced by the sweeping legislation of the NLEA in
1990.146
3. Labeling is the Least Paternalistic Intervention
Another major benefit of labeling is that it may be the most palatable
option to consumers in balancing their autonomy to make choices about
their health, despite this personal choice narrative being fueled by
industry framing.147 Surveys have shown considerably more support for
labeling options that provide information than for taxes on unhealthy
foods such as sugary beverages.148 Thus, there is support for what has
been termed “libertarian paternalism,” in which interventions are
designed to alter consumer behavior without restricting their choice or
providing economic incentives.149 This approach is also consistent with
recommendations from the National Research Council, which identified
“public acceptance” as a factor to consider when assessing the risks for a
new food regulation initiative.150
B. Label Standardization Negates Fragmentation in the Regulatory
Environment
Fragmentation within the regulatory environment for food safety is
often cited as a source of inefficiency.151 Labeling presents a workaround
for that problem because the FDA has clear authority over labeling.
Following the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, the FDA was given
144. Mara A. Michaels, FDA Regulation of Health Claims Under the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990: A Proposal for a Less Restrictive Scientific Standard, 44 EMORY L.J. 319,
323 (1995).
145. Id. at 319.
146. Id. at 319–20.
147. See Laura Nixon et al., “We’re Part of the Solution”: Evolution of the Food and
Beverage Industry’s Framing of Obesity Concerns Between 2000 and 2012, 105 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2228 (2015) (for commentary on the concerted efforts of the food industry to frame health
issues as a personal choice debate).
148. Sarah E. Gollust et al., Americans’ Opinions About Policies to Reduce Consumption of
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 63 PREVENTIVE MED. J. 201 (2014) (results of survey show the
smallest amount of support for taxes and portion control at just above 20%, while large
prominently displayed labels with calorie information garnered support from 65%).
149. Rhode, supra note 59, at 501.
150. See INST. MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 8.
151. Supra Part II.C.
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unilateral control over the standardized nutrition label that is required for
all food products.
1. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and Rise of Uniform
Labels
The 1990 NLEA marked the most influential new piece of legislation
to empower the FDA since the 1938 Food Drug and Cosmetics Act.152 It
was passed on the heels of a more extensive investigation and report by
the Institute of Medicine into dietary risks from poor nutritional health
and the utility of labeling as a balanced policy solution.153 The main
purposes of the NLEA were: (1) to make labels clearer; (2) to help
consumers make healthier choices; and (3) to incentivize the food
industry to improve the nutritional quality of their food.154 The NLEA
created clear and enforceable standards with a single label requirement,
and was able to be enacted in part because the FDA worked with industry
leaders to garner the necessary political support.155
2. Expressly Preempts State Requirements
Another critical way in which the NLEA and the standardized label
consolidate power for the FDA is that Congress explicitly preempted state
laws that conflicted with the NLEA provisions.156 Thus, the NLEA not
only bolstered the FDA’s federal authority, but also eliminated
fragmentation and conflicts resulting from state authority.157 This is
important because states all have different views on how much regulation
there should be of nutrition, with some viewing even minor regulations
as impinging on the autonomy of industry and consumers.158 In conflicts
of law disputes, courts have generally applied Congress’ explicit
preemptive requirements.159
152. Fred R. Shank, The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 47 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 247 (1992); 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2018).
153. INST. MED., NUTRITION LABELING: ISSUE AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1990S (1990),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1576.html [https://perma.cc/BC3H-FHCX] [hereinafter 1989 IOM
Report] (report by the Institute of Medicine, sponsored by the FDA and USDA, tasked with
analyzing nutrition health issues and the appropriateness of labeling solutions).
154. Kessler, supra note 45, at 21.
155. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 106, at 49 (“[I]t was the food industry, after all, that got us
from food labeling rules to food labels.”).
156. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1461.
157. See INST. MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 5–7.
158. Rhode, supra note 59, at 492, 500, 502 (explaining that regulators face pushback in
jurisdictions all around the country due to fear of market failures from paternalistic policies).
159. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1001 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“Compliance with both the state and federal requirements is impossible. To the extent that it
attempts to regulate the labeling of alternative cheese, the New York law is preempted.”), aff’d
sub nom. Gerace v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 474 U.S. 801, 801 (1985).
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C. Labeling is an Economically Efficient Approach to Nutrition
Regulation
The FDA is often limited by the resources it has available, hence its
longstanding goal to create programs that are efficient in promoting
health.160 Labeling is a strong option in advancing this goal because it
spreads the cost throughout industry and requires less costly enforcement
effort by the FDA to maintain.161 More ambitious, hands-on initiatives,
such as those proposed in the 2011 Food Safety and Modernization Act,
which involve direct oversight of produce suppliers, have resulted in
shortfalls of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding.162 By contrast,
some more modest proposals, such as calorie disclosures, are viewed as
low cost initiatives that are cost effective relative to other types of
government interventions.163
D. 2016 Nutrition Panel Update by FDA Exemplifies the Incremental
Approach
In a much overdue update, the FDA published a new rule in May of
2016 which was designed to reflect “new scientific information,
including the link between diet and chronic disease.”164 These changes
mark the first major update to the Nutrition Facts Panel in over twenty
years since its introduction in 1993, as the FDA increasingly focuses on
improving dietary health through more informed consumer choice.165 The
2016 label update provides a recent example of the feasibility of
incremental change via labeling that avoids the pitfalls of previous failed
regulations because: (1) it built on existing labeling authority (politically
favored); (2) in an area where FDA power is consolidated (fragmentation

160. See Hutt, supra note 21, at 103–04 (“[W]e must set priorities and develop programs
designed to achieve the greatest impact possible from the limited resources available.”).
161. 1989 IOM Report, supra note 153, at 265 (discussing strategies of promoting dietary
changes and noting that there are more personalized methods than labeling, but that they would
be inefficient for large populations, whereas labeling strikes a good balance).
162. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 10.
163. Rhode, supra note 59, at 523; see also Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and
Consumer Choice Theory in Nutritional Labeling, WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1191–92 (2004) (discussing
the relatively low cost of nutritional requirements on menus for fast food restaurants).
164. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHANGES TO THE NUTRITION FACTS LABEL,
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/changes-nutrition-facts-label [https://perma.cc
/UG6Q-F52H] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
165. Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on an Updated Approach for
Including Added Sugar Information on the Nutrition Facts Labels of Pure Maple Syrup and
Honey, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Statement from FDA
Commissioner], https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-comm
issioner-scott-gottlieb-md-updated-approach-including-added-sugar-information [https://perma.
cc/7WKZ-EJR4].
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less of an issue); and (3) it did not require excessively cost-intensive
overhauls for the FDA or industry.
1. Changes Including Added Sugar and Daily Value
The 2016 update includes a few key changes and follows on the heels
of the 2015–2020 Dietary Guidelines for Americans, published every five
years.166 Those changes include more prominent displays of the calorie
count and servings per container, as well as an update to serving sizes to
represent more accurately the actual eating habits of Americans.167
Perhaps the most surprising update, though, was the change to the way in
which sugar must now be listed on the label.
The FDA now requires an “added sugars” (non-naturally present
sugar) entry on the nutrition label, both in grams and as a percentage of
the daily value.168 This follows on the inclusion of strong evidence within
the Dietary Guidelines that it is difficult to obtain the necessary nutrients
for a healthy diet when sugar represents more than 10% of one’s daily
caloric intake.169 It remains to be seen whether the courts will endorse
this form of compelled speech, considering the strongly supported public
health objectives.170 The FDA also followed recommendations from a
2010 report by the Institute of Medicine, suggesting that labels list all
forms of sugar (e.g., high fructose corn syrup, glucose, fructose) as one
ingredient, so that consumers could accurately assess the proportion of
sweeteners in total.171 Needless to say, these changes did not come about
without resistance from the sugar-related industries.

166. Id.
167. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE NEW AND IMPROVED NUTRITION FACTS LABEL –
KEY CHANGES (Jan. 2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/99331/download [https://perma.cc/N7Z5SETP] (reprinted in Appendix A for full visual illustration of changes); see also Dabrowska, supra
note 103, at 5 (2014) (noting changes to “Reference Amount Customarily Consumed,” since data
for original reference was gathered in 1977 and 1988, and habits have changed).
168. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADDED SUGARS: NOW LISTED ON THE NUTRITION FACTS
LABEL 1, 2 (Mar. 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135299/download [https://perma.cc/RZ6FK7W8].
169. Id. at 2; Statement from FDA Commissioner, supra note 165; Food Labeling: Revision
of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 Fed. Reg. 33,742, 33,813 (May 27, 2016) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
170. See Colleen Smith, A Spoonful of (Added) Sugar Helps the Constitution Go Down:
Curing the Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine with FDA's Added Sugars Rule, 71 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 442 (2016) (discussing the unresolved nature of compelled speech doctrine and arguing
that an added sugars requirement is different from the existing jurisprudence because it is not
necessarily addressing deceptive practices).
171. See INST. MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 40; see also Food Labeling:
Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 Fed. Reg. at 33803.
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2. Industry Influence on the “Added Sugar” Debate
Almost immediately after the FDA’s announcement of the proposed
“added sugar” addition to the nutrition label, sugar-related industries—
termed “Big Sugar” by the press—voiced opposition.172 “Big Sugar”
claimed the evidence was lacking, even though many of the leading
domestic and international health organizations had published wellsupported conclusions that American rates of sugar intake were too
high.173 While consumer-oriented organizations such as the Center for
Science in the Public Interest had long supported this change, the sugar
industry had been running its own campaign of influence for decades.174
That industry influence had an effect in many of the major channels that
drive public opinion and legislation.
In the public domain, the food industry has employed a complex,
multipronged campaign, promoting their most controversial views
through non-profits that they fund, as well as through trade associations,
so as not to damage their individual brands.175 In fact, food executives
have admitted as much, saying that they use non-profits to promote more
proactive and irreverent criticisms specifically because donations are
anonymous.176 Perhaps more insidious, though, is the effect food
executives have had on research conclusions.
Because sugar consumption is quite high, there have been many
studies on the effect of sugar consumption on weight gain, and then
systematic reviews analyzing the findings of those studies in the
aggregate. However, a comprehensive meta-analysis of the effect of
financial industry funding or conflicts of interest on the findings of those
systematic reviews reveals likely bias.177 From the eighteen systematic
reviews identified, in the twelve where there was not a conflict of interest,
ten of them found consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages to be a risk
172. See Roberto A. Ferdman, Why the Sugar Industry Hates the FDA’s New Nutrition Facts
Label, WASH. POST (May 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/
20/why-the-sugar-industry-hates-the-fdas-new-nutrition-facts-label/ [https://perma.cc/46PJ-WQ6E].
173. See Roberto A. Ferdman, The Crucial FDA Nutrition Label Battle You Probably Don’t
Know About, but Should, WASH. POST (July 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/07/02/the-crucial-fda-nutrition-label-battle-you-probably-dont-know-about-butshould/ [https://perma.cc/8DX7-6V3B]; see also Appendix B for visual graph of American
consumption as compared to health guidelines from leading institutions.
174. See Ferdman, supra note 172.
175. See Nixon et al., supra note 147, at 2231 (industry used a variety of tactics, often
promoting more controversial narratives, such as obesity not being a significant health risk,
through nonprofits that they funded, rather than directly from the companies).
176. Id.
177. See Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest and Reporting Bias
Regarding the Association between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic
Review of Systematic Reviews, 10 PLOS MED. 1 (2013) (meta-analysis of meta-analyses on the
effect of financial interests on research conclusions).
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factor for weight gain.178 By contrast, of the six systematic reviews that
had conflicts of interest in funding, only one found a positive association
between sugar consumption and weight gain.179
All of this may begin to sound similar to the story of “Big Tobacco”
and its efforts to mislead the public. In fact, that conclusion is not far off,
as studies have also found that corporations in the food industry
manipulated evidence in ways not accepted by the scientific community,
similar to the ways in which the tobacco industry misled health
officials.180 Thus, the finalization of the 2016 labeling rule after just two
years of discussion represents a small but critical step forward against
daunting obstacles from industry opponents.
IV. THE FDA’S FUTURE IN PROMOTING NUTRITION
The 1990 Nutrition Education and Labeling Act, as well as the recent
2016 updates to the rules by the FDA, indicate that there is the most
political momentum for solutions to nutrition concerns in the labeling
domain. Focusing on the FDA’s clearly established power to regulate
labeling, the agency can inform consumers of the health risks of food
products while respecting individual freedom of choice. Thus, a strategy
for the next steps in addressing nutritional deficiencies should be focused
on improving labeling to communicate more effectively with consumers.
Two related improvements that may advance consumer absorption of
vital information would be focusing on nutritional nudges and using
visual front-of-package solutions. Labeling interventions of this sort have
already shown promising results in other countries facing similar
nutrition crises by curbing consumption of unhealthy products.181
A. Focusing on Nutritional Nudges via Informative Labeling
An update to the nutrition panel was the first step in providing
consumers with more accurate information. However, consumers still
have had difficulty in comprehending and using labels in their current
form.182 Thus, the FDA should look more carefully at ways in which the
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Gary Jonas Fooks et al., Corporations’ Use and Misuse of Evidence to Influence
Health Policy: A Case Study of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxation, 15 GLOBALIZATION AND
HEALTH 1 (2019).
181. See Andrew Jacobs, Sugary Drink Consumption Plunges in Chile After New Food Law,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/health/chile-soda-warninglabel.html?algo=identity&fellback=false&imp_id=561700973&imp_id=83508295&action=clic
k&module=Science%20%20Technology&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/7EX9-YSH5]
(coverage of new study finding dramatic decrease in sugar consumption following an aggressive
effort in Chile to educate consumers about the sugar content of food products).
182. See Jane Kolodinsky, Persistence of Health Labeling Information Asymmetry in the
United States: Historical Perspectives and Twenty-First Century Realities, 32(2) J.
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presentation and manner in which information is communicated may
have an effect on the consumers. One approach is to design methods of
communication that point the consumer in the right direction. These
signposts for the consumer are known as “nudges” by experts.183
The main benefit of nudges is that they preserve the autonomy of the
decision makers—the consumers—by not mandating what they must
choose or providing economic incentives, but still guiding their decision
towards the rational (or healthy) path.184 These nudges should be
designed by a special team within the FDA and be simple and intuitive
indicators for consumers at the point of purchase. An example of this
method would be requiring the industry to highlight or use a red font on
rows in the nutrition label where an ingredient reaches a certain threshold
(e.g., greater than 100% of daily value for sugar or salt per serving). The
most intuitive place for these signals though is the front of the package.
B. Front of Package Labeling and Visuals
A slightly more aggressive method—and logical next step—is to
require disclosures on the front of labels. Front-of-package solutions have
been increasing in popularity in other countries and could provide models
for the FDA.185 For example, the FDA could adopt the UK system known
as the Multiple Traffic Light System, which uses the familiar three-color
system of stoplights to indicate the relative healthiness of a food.186 This
could be used in conjunction with a system of highlights on the nutrition
facts label, which is consistent and color-coordinated. Such a system
would also be in line with the findings of the second phase of an extensive
report, which the FDA partially funded, by the Institute of Medicine on
front-of-package solutions.187 That report found four important attributes
of successful labeling systems: (1) simple and understandable; (2)
presented as interpretive guidance, not facts; (3) ordinal (scale of relative
value); and (4) easily identifiable and communicated.188
The concept of front-of-label health information in the United States
is certainly not new, but has historically been a battleground of first
MACROMARKETING 193 (2012).
183. Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 583 (2014).
184. Id.
185. Elsa Savourey, Supermarket Heuristics: Behavioral Insights into the U.S. Nutrition
Labeling Policy, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 89, 114 (2016); see also Jacobs, supra note 181
(describing a system that was implemented in 2016 in Chile that includes black stop signs on
products that are high in calories or non-nutritious ingredients such as sugar).
186. Gyorgy Scrinis & Christine Parker, Front-of-Pack Food Labeling and the Politics of
Nutritional Nudges, 38 UNIV. DENVER L. & POL’Y 234, 235 (2016).
187. See INST. MED., Report Brief, FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND
SYMBOLS: PROMOTING HEALTHIER CHOICES (Oct. 2011), https://www.nap.edu/resource/13221/
frontofpackagereportbriefFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7RQ-EG5T].
188. Id. at 2.
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amendment rights, with an industry seeking to include health claims
designed to entice buyers.189 Serious attempts to require front-of-package
disclosures or warnings have taken place, so far, only at local levels in
cities such as San Francisco for sugar and New York for salt-content, with
mixed results.190 Thus, while the FDA may have the statutory authority
to require additional front-of-label information, it remains to be seen if
the judiciary will interpret such actions as an infringement on commercial
speech rights, particularly for visual graphics, which are more
controversial.191
CONCLUSION
The FDA has come a long way from its origins in protecting
consumers from the horrendously unsanitary practices of meat factories.
The challenges the FDA faces have evolved as well, as we have entered
an era of abundant but nutrient-poor food. In this new era, the FDA must
find solutions that make consumers aware of the degree of peril they are
taking when choosing to consume unhealthy foods, so that they can make
better dietary choices.
Labeling is likely the best path forward to accomplish the FDA’s goals
of protecting consumers, due to its political feasibility, clear statutory
basis, and relative economic efficiency. Reform of the nutrition panel
alone will not be sufficient to address all nutrition concerns. Therefore,
the FDA should consider front-of-package labeling options, focused on
guiding consumers to healthier choices, and ideally causing industry to
shift their offerings over time.

189. See supra Part II.A.2.
190. See supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion on affirmative labeling; N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n
v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In light of Zauderer, this Circuit
thus held that rules ‘mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial information’ are
subject to the rational basis test.”); Am. Beverage Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 916
F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (“On this record, therefore, the 20% requirement is not justified and
is unduly burdensome when balanced against its likely burden on protected speech.”).
191. See Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 53, 69 (2016) (discussing use of visual pictures in compelled speech
debate).
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APPENDIX

Source: The New and Improved Nutrition Facts Label- Key Changes,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/
99331/download [https://perma.cc/P85U-QG4U].
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Source: Robert A. Ferdman, The Crucial FDA Nutrition Label Battle You
Probably Don’t Know About But Should, WASH. POST (July 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/02/the-crucialfda-nutrition-label-battle-you-probably-dont-know-about-but-should/
[https://perma.cc/9AY6-JJML].

